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Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care 
AG—The Well-Known Marks Doctrine 
Reconsidered 
Wee Jin Yeo* 
Abstract 
The territoriality principle, basic to United States trademark 
law, provides that foreign uses of a trademark do not give the user 
trademark rights in the United States. An important exception to 
this principle is the well-known marks doctrine, which allows a 
foreign user to obtain priority rights in the United States over a 
mark used exclusively overseas, if it has achieved a measure of 
renown in the United States. However, until now, it remains 
uncertain whether the doctrine is part of United States federal 
trademark law, given the split between the Ninth and the Second 
Circuits on the issue. 
On March 23, 2016, the Fourth Circuit handed down the 
decision of Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, which 
protected foreign marks neither registered nor used in the United 
States. 
This Article takes this timely opportunity to revive the debate 
on the applicability of the well-known marks doctrine in 
trademark law. Analyzing the Fourth Circuit’s decision, this 
Article argues that it provides a useful insight on how the circuit 
split should be resolved, but cautions future courts not to 
mechanically apply the Fourth Circuit’s decision. 
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I. Introduction 
The territoriality principle has been exhorted as a 
fundamental principle of trademark law.1 Under this principle, ―a 
trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each 
sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized 
as a mark.‖2 Accordingly, a strict application of this principle 
would dictate that a prior use of a trademark in a foreign country 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching 
Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887 (2004) (―[I]t is 
an axiomatic principle of domestic and international law that trademarks and 
trademark law are territorial.‖). 
 2.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:1 
(4th ed. 2016). 
 
190 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 188 (2016) 
is insufficient for its owner to assert trademark rights against a 
domestic junior user who had first used the mark in the United 
States. One important—albeit controversial—exception to this 
fundamental principle is the well-known marks doctrine. The 
doctrine provides that exclusive use of a mark overseas may give 
the owner of that mark priority in the United States if the mark 
is sufficiently well known to consumers in the United States, 
even if neither goods nor services are offered in the United 
States.3 
However, it remains an open question whether United States 
federal trademark law incorporates the well-known marks 
doctrine, as the Ninth and Second Circuits are split on the issue. 
While the Ninth Circuit has definitively held that a well-known 
marks exception to the territoriality principle exists in federal 
law,4 the Second Circuit has explicitly rejected the doctrine as 
part of federal law.5 Recently, the Fourth Circuit entered the fray 
in Belmora LLC v Bayer Consumer Care AG,6 holding that 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act7 offers protection to foreign 
                                                                                                     
 3.  See Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don’t I Know You from Somewhere? 
Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks that Are Well Known But 
Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1380–82 (2008) (defining the well-
known marks doctrine). 
 4.  See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (―We hold, however, that there is a famous mark exception to the 
territoriality principle.‖). 
 5.  See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(―Absent such Congressional recognition, we must decline ITC‘s invitation to 
grant judicial recognition to the famous marks doctrine simply as a matter of 
policy.‖). 
 6.  No. 15-1335, 2016 WL 1135518 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2016). 
 7.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act reads as follows: 
(1)  Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
or misleading representation of fact, which— 
 (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
 (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person‘s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
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marks that are neither registered nor used in United States 
commerce.8 Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit made no reference 
to the well-known marks doctrine as discussed in the Ninth and 
Second Circuit decisions. In this vein, the Fourth Circuit‘s 
decision provides a timely opportunity to discuss whether any 
normative and statutory bases for recognizing a well-known 
marks doctrine exist in United States law. This Article argues 
that the circuit split should be resolved in favor of recognizing the 
well-known marks doctrine under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act—the provision on which the Fourth Circuit relied to vindicate 
the ―rights‖ of a foreign mark holder, given the strong policy 
reasons for its recognition. 
That said, this Article disagrees with how the Fourth Circuit 
arrived at its conclusion, and how it appears to have unjustifiably 
done away with the requirement that a mark must be sufficiently 
well known to be protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
without proof of domestic use.  
II. Normative Considerations Underlying the Territoriality 
Principle: Preventing Consumer Confusion and Preserving 
Producer Goodwill 
―Trademark law aims to protect the reputation and goodwill 
of a mark, and thus the mark‘s owner, and to protect consumers 
from deception and confusion as to the source of goods and 
services.‖9 Case law is replete with judicial affirmations of these 
two goals as the foundational policy considerations of trademark 
law.10 While there has been some debate as to whether both goals 
                                                                                                     
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2012). 
 8.  See Belmora, 2016 WL 1135518, at *12 (ruling ―that Bayer is entitled to 
bring its unfair competition claims under Lanham Act § 43(a)‖). 
 9.  Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Territoriality (Mis)understood: Enforcing Well-
Known Foreign Marks in the United States, in TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND 
TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 233, 244 (Irene Calboli & 
Edward Lee eds., 2014). 
 10.  See, e.g., Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 
(D. Mass. 2009) (―The Lanham Act . . . serves two basic purposes: foremost, 
preventing the use of similar or identical marks in a way that confuses the 
public about the actual source of the goods and services; and second, the 
protection of the goodwill that companies have built up in their trademarks.‖). 
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ought to be coequal in delineating the contours of trademark law 
in general,11 that debate need not detain us here, as both goals 
are equally furthered by the territoriality principle, which 
recognizes that trademark holders only have rights in territories 
where they use the trademark and thus enjoy protectable 
trademark goodwill.12 A simple illustration will show that the 
territoriality principle is equally compatible with both goals. 
When Producer A uses his mark on the goods he offers for 
sale, consumers start to associate the mark with him and the 
mark helps consumers distinguish his goods from his 
competitors‘. Trademarks thus become repositories of protectable 
goodwill. Accordingly, the subsequent use of the same trademark 
by Competitor B in the same territory where Producer A enjoys 
goodwill would likely engender consumer confusion and amount 
to misappropriation of Producer A‘s goodwill. In accordance with 
both goals, the territoriality principle does not prevent Producer 
A from enjoining Competitor B‘s use. 
The analysis is different if Producer A uses his mark in a 
geographically remote foreign territory from Producer C who uses 
the same mark in the United States. Since consumers in the 
United States have not been exposed to Producer A‘s mark, it is 
unlikely that they would experience any confusion.13 
Concomitantly, there is less concern that Producer C is free 
riding on Producer A‘s goodwill. Indeed, the territoriality 
principle steps in to prevent Producer A from asserting any 
trademark rights against Producer C. 
                                                                                                     
 11.  See Lockridge, supra note 9, at 244 n.48 (citing Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–
48, 1860–66 (2007)) (discussing the scholarship analyzing the twin goals of 
trademark law). 
 12.  See Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 894 (―Whether viewed as an instrument 
to preserve producer goodwill or to protect consumers against confusion, the 
purpose of trademark law was served by recognizing rights in the local 
producer.‖).  
 13.  See LaLonde, supra note 3, at 1404–05 (―Where a mark is used 
exclusively outside the United States, many United States consumers will 
typically not be exposed to it. If a United States company begins using a foreign 
trademark in the United States that United States consumers have not heard of, 
confusion is unlikely.‖). 
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III. The Second and Ninth Circuit are Split on Whether the 
Lanham Act Incorporates Protection for Well-Known Marks 
The foregoing section illustrates that the territoriality 
principle rests on sound normative bases—it restricts the scope of 
a trademark holder‘s trademark rights to the scope of his 
goodwill within the United States,14 so as to serve the intrinsic 
purposes of trademark law. That said, do the same policy 
considerations require the territoriality principle to be absolute? 
Should federal law recognize a well-known marks exception to 
the territoriality principle? 
To set the stage for the discussion of these issues, this Article 
shall briefly examine the circuit split between the Ninth and 
Second Circuits on whether United States trademark law offers 
protection to well-known foreign marks not used in the United 
States.  
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Position in Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. 
Dallo & Co.15 
In Grupo, the plaintiff grocery chain, Grupo Gigante, had 
used the mark ―Gigante‖ in Mexico since 1962, but only 
considered expanding into the United States in 1995.16 To its 
consternation, it discovered that the defendant, Dallo & Co., had 
been operating a grocery store in San Diego by the name of 
―Gigante Market‖ since 1991.17 The plaintiff then sued the 
defendant for, inter alia, trademark infringement under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act.18 As a starting point, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed that the territoriality principle was ―basic to trademark 
law.‖19 However, the court then articulated that the principle was 
not absolute and that it was subject to the well-known marks 
                                                                                                     
 14.  See Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 894 (―Stated differently, trademarks 
are merely the vessels for a legally protectable interest, namely, goodwill, and 
the scope of that protectable interest thus defines the scope of trademark 
rights.‖).  
 15.  391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 16.  Id. at 1091. 
 17.  Id.  
 18. Id. at 1092. 
 19. Id. at 1093. 
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exception under which an exclusive use of a mark overseas may 
confer trademark rights on a foreign mark holder if the mark is 
sufficiently well known to United States consumers.20 
Significantly, the court based its decision on policy, stating that 
given the borderless nature of commerce and the prevalence of 
international travel today, ―[a]n absolute territoriality rule 
without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer 
confusion and fraud.‖21 While the court relied on federal law in 
reaching its result, it notably ―did not specify where in the rather 
large body of federal trademark law it located this protection.‖22  
B. The Second Circuit’s Position in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.23 
In ITC, the plaintiff Indian corporation, ITC Limited, 
operated a famous restaurant called ―Bukhara‖ in New Delhi.24 
Subsequently, the plaintiff decided to expand into the United 
States, opening a restaurant in Manhattan in 1986 and another, 
through a franchise agreement, in Chicago in 1987.25 However, 
the plaintiff‘s foray into the United States met with limited 
success; its Manhattan restaurant closed down in 1991 and it 
discontinued its Chicago franchise in 1997.26 Since then, the 
plaintiff had not used its ―Bukhara‖ mark in connection with 
―restaurant services‖ in the United States.27 Subsequently, in 
1999, the defendant, Punchgini, Inc., opened the ―Bukhara Grill‖ 
in New York, mimicking ―the [plaintiff] Bukharas‘ logos, décor, 
staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checkered-customer 
bibs.‖28 The plaintiff then sued the defendant for, inter alia, 
unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.29 The 
                                                                                                     
 20.  See id. at 1093–94 (discussing both the plaintiff‘s and defendant‘s 
interpretation of the well-known marks exception). 
 21.  Id. at 1094. 
 22.  Lockridge, supra note 9, at 238. 
 23.  482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 24.  Id. at 143. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 147. 
 28.  Id. at 144. 
 29. Id. at 145. 
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Second Circuit affirmed the territoriality principle as being so 
fundamental to United States trademark law that it should not 
be departed from except by Congress.30 Intuitively, the 
territoriality principle made good sense to the Second Circuit; 
since trademarks in the United States exist to protect goodwill 
and goodwill is created domestically through trademark use, a 
United States trademark ought to only protect domestic 
goodwill.31 On the basis of this intuitive appeal and the well-
established nature of the territoriality principle, the court refused 
to recognize the well-known marks exception. It stated that the 
recognition of a well-known marks exception would engender an 
unjustifiably ―radical change in basic trademark law.‖32 
Significantly, the court also noted ―the absence of any statutory 
provision expressly incorporating the famous marks doctrine‖33 as 
a factor militating against recognition of the doctrine under 
federal law. 
C. Interim Conclusions 
While the Ninth and Second Circuits both disagree on 
whether federal law incorporates the well-known marks doctrine, 
they both at least agree that policy considerations support the 
recognition of the doctrine.34 Indeed, although the Second Circuit 
refused to recognize the well-known marks doctrine as part of 
federal law, it acknowledged ―that a persuasive policy argument 
can be advanced in support of the . . . doctrine.‖35 As will be 
shown in the following paragraphs, policy considerations 
                                                                                                     
 30.  See id. at 165 (―In light of the comprehensive and frequently modified 
federal statutory scheme for trademark protection set forth in the Lanham Act, 
we conclude that any policy arguments in favor of the famous marks doctrine 
must be submitted to Congress . . . .‖). 
 31.  See id. at 155 (discussing the justifications for the territoriality 
principle). 
 32.  Id. at 161. 
 33.  Id. at 164. 
 34.  See id. at 165 (noting that the doctrine ―may promote sound policy‖); 
Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(―An absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would 
promote consumer confusion and fraud.‖). 
 35.  ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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underlying the territoriality principle may be extended to support 
the well-known marks exception.  
The territoriality principle traditionally protected domestic 
goodwill, as it assumed that goodwill only subsisted in the 
country where the trademark owner used the mark. In other 
words, the territoriality principle operated under the assumption 
that ―each country is an insulated market in which goodwill can 
be analyzed separately from any associations a mark may carry 
in another country.‖36  
While this assumption may have made sense in the past 
when ―brand manufacturers [were] . . . confined to local 
markets,‖37 it is clearly untenable in light of the ―integrated and 
universal consumer marketplace‖38 that we participate in today. 
As Professor Lockridge rightly observed, ―in this age of easier, 
more affordable national and international travel and almost-
zero-marginal-cost global communications networks, knowledge 
of a mark and its associated goods and services can certainly 
travel beyond the geographic reach of actual use.‖39 Thus, it is 
very likely that a famous foreign mark holder may enjoy goodwill 
in the United States and that consumers in the United States 
may be confused by a local firm‘s use of the famous foreign mark 
in connection with its goods and services. In turn, it follows that 
while domestic use may continue to be a good proxy for 
protectable goodwill,40 the converse that protectable goodwill can 
only exist with domestic use is not true.41 As rightly noted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Grupo Gigante, allowing local firms to use 
foreign marks that have achieved renown in the United States 
would be tantamount to sanctioning the creation of consumer 
                                                                                                     
 36.  Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known 
Foreign Marks in the United States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic 
Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COMM. REG. 1, 8 (2012). 
 37.  Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony 
Possible in the Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 104 (1996). 
 38.  Bird & Brown, supra note 36, at 2. 
 39.  Lockridge, supra note 9, at 247. 
 40.  See id. at 246 (―[P]roof of local use is a proxy for proof of protectable 
goodwill, which is the keystone of commercial and consumer interests protected 
by trademark law.‖). 
 41.  See id. at 245 (―While it is true that some use is required for goodwill to 
develop, domestic law does not hold that goodwill, and trademark rights 
protecting that goodwill, cannot extend beyond the area of use.‖). 
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confusion and the misappropriation of goodwill.42 Accordingly, the 
―bedrock‖43 territoriality principle can and should be qualified by 
the well-known marks exception to ensure that trademark law 
develops in tandem with global developments and continues to 
effectively serve its function of preventing consumer confusion 
and preserving producer goodwill.  
The above analysis illustrates that the Second Circuit erred 
in refusing to recognize a well-known marks exception to the 
territoriality principle, despite the persuasive policy reasons 
justifying its recognition. The territoriality principle, being a 
policy construct, ought to adapt to the global marketplace we live 
in today. That said, the Second Circuit in ITC was also influenced 
by the need to refrain from judicial legislation, given that 
Congress‘s intent was regarded to be ambiguous and that no 
provision in the Lanham Act expressly referenced the well-known 
marks doctrine.44  
This Article argues that the Second Circuit‘s concern about 
judicial legislation may be addressed by situating the statutory 
basis of the well-known marks doctrine in Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, consistent with how the Fourth Circuit protected a 
foreign mark not used in the United States in the recently-
decided case of Belmora LLC v Bayer Consumer Care AG.45 This 
would effectively resolve the circuit split that has plagued the 
courts since 2007. However, the Fourth Circuit‘s decision is 
problematic in a number of ways. Thus, the next Part critiques 
the Fourth Circuit‘s decision, distilling insights that may be 
gleaned, as well as identifying pitfalls to avoid. 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See supra note 34. 
 43.  Lockridge, supra note 9, at 243. 
 44.  See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(―Before we construe the Lanham Act to include such a significant departure 
from the principle of territoriality, we will wait for Congress to express its intent 
more clearly.‖). 
 45.  No. 15–1335, 2016 WL 1135518 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2016). 
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IV. Resolving the Circuit Split and a Critique of the Fourth 
Circuit’s Decision in Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG 
A. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG 
In Belmora, the plaintiff, Bayer Consumer Care AG, sold 
naproxen sodium pain relievers under the ―FLANAX‖ mark in 
Mexico since the 1970s, but never in the United States.46 Instead, 
its sister company sold the same product under the mark 
―ALEVE‖ in the United States.47 In 2004, the defendant, Belmora 
LLC, began selling naproxen sodium tablets in the United States 
under the ―FLANAX‖ mark,48 adopting product packaging that 
even today remains similar to that of Bayer‘s FLANAX 
packaging.49 In 2007, the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging, 
inter alia, that the plaintiff ―was injured by [the defendant‘s] 
false association with its FLANAX product in violation of 
Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A).‖50 
In holding that foreign marks neither used nor registered in 
the United States may be protected under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, the Fourth Circuit observed that in contrast to 
Section 32 of the Act—the provision oft used to obtain protection 
against infringement of a registered trademark—the literal 
wording of Section 43(a) did not require a plaintiff to use a mark 
in United States commerce to bring a Section 43(a) action.51 
While the court acknowledged that prior cases ―appear[ed] to 
have treated a plaintiff‘s use of a mark in United States 
commerce as a prerequisite for a false association claim,‖52 it 
ultimately dismissed them on the ground that none of these cases 
made it ―the ratio decidendi of its holding or analyzed whether 
the statute in fact contains such a requirement.‖53  
                                                                                                     
 46.  Id. at *1. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at *1–2. 
 50.  Id. at *3. 
 51.  See id. at *4 (―Significantly, the plain language of § 43(a) does not 
require that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce as 
an element of the cause of action. . . . [I]t is the defendant's use in 
commerce . . . that creates the injury under the terms of the statute.‖). 
 52.  Id. at *7. 
 53.  Id. 
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The court then further justified its position on the basis of 
two instances where a plaintiff who had not used a mark in 
United States commerce could nevertheless avail himself of a 
Section 43(a) action. The first was that a plaintiff whose mark 
had become generic could plead a Section 43(a) claim against a 
competitor who used the generic mark, yet did not seek to 
distinguish himself from the plaintiff, if his competitor‘s use 
―cause[d] ‗confusion or a likelihood of confusion.‘‖54 The second 
was that a plaintiff who did not use his mark in United States 
commerce could nevertheless sue a defendant for reverse passing 
off under Section 43(a), if the defendant offered the plaintiff‘s 
goods for sale but represented them as his own.55 The court 
reasoned that if use in United States commerce were a 
prerequisite to bringing a Section 43(a) action, these two 
established causes of action could not exist.56 
B. Resolving the Circuit Split: Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as 
the Statutory Basis for the Well-Known Marks Doctrine 
The key insight that may be gleaned from the Fourth 
Circuit‘s decision is that Section 43(a), which protects against the 
infringement of unregistered marks,57 provides a sound legal 
basis for recognizing the well-known marks doctrine. As the 
Fourth Circuit correctly observed, Section 43(a) does not contain 
any ―express requirement‖ that a plaintiff must use its mark in 
United States commerce.58 Thus, the Lanham Act does not 
preclude reliance on Section 43(a) to give effect to the well-known 
marks doctrine. Besides, as Part III.C has highlighted, the well-
known marks doctrine furthers the twin purposes of trademark 
law of preventing consumer confusion and preserving producer 
                                                                                                     
 54.  Id. (quoting Blinded Veterans Ass‘n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 
872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 55.  See id. at *8 (listing the elements of a ―reverse passing off‖ case). 
 56.  See id. (―The generic mark and reverse passing off cases illustrate that 
§ 43(a) actions do not require, implicitly or otherwise, that a plaintiff have first 
used its own mark in United States commerce.‖). 
 57.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 27:12 (noting that § 43(a) ―serve[s] as 
a vehicle for asserting infringement of unregistered marks‖). 
 58.  LaLonde, supra note 3, at 1398. 
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goodwill. Therefore, the courts would be well justified to rely on 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to give effect to the doctrine. 
At this point, it should be noted that while the Second Circuit 
relied on the lack of any express mention of the well-known 
marks doctrine in the Lanham Act to reject its existence outright, 
it did so in relation to Sections 44(b)59 and 44(h)60 of the Lanham 
Act. Taken in this light, it was fair for the Second Circuit to have 
done so; otherwise, the ramification would have been to judicially 
legislate, inter alia, the Paris Convention‘s broad prohibition 
against unfair competition into federal law.61 As Anne Gilson 
LaLonde adroitly noted, if the enactment of Section 44 were 
really intended to grant substantive rights consistent with 
international agreements to which the United States is a party, it 
would have specifically spelt out this extensive grant of rights.62 
                                                                                                     
 59.  See 15 U.S.C § 1126(b) (2012)  
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or 
treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the 
repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a 
party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States 
by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the 
conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to 
any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition 
to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by 
this chapter. 
 60.  See id. § 1126(h) 
Any designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the 
benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled 
to effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies 
provided in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available 
so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair 
competition. 
 61.  See LaLonde, supra note 3, at 1400 (explaining the argument in favor of 
finding a federal statutory right to enforce the reputation alone of a well-known 
foreign mark in Section 44). LaLonde writes: 
Section 44(h) entitles foreign trademark owners to ‗effective 
protection against unfair competition‘ and Section 44(b) expands that 
protection ‗to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of 
such convention.‘ Actionable ‗unfair competition‘ therefore includes 
whatever is barred by ‗any provision‘ of an international agreement, 
including the Paris Convention. So a foreign trademark owner can 
sue under Section 44 of the Lanham Act for violations of Article 6bis 
of the Paris Convention.  
Id. 
 62.  See id. (arguing that ―expanding the concept of ‗unfair competition‘ to 
‗any convention or treaty relating to trademarks . . . or unfair competition‘ to 
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Therefore, while the Second Circuit may have been justified in 
not giving effect to the well-known marks doctrine via Sections 
44(b) and 44(h) of the Lanham Act, its underlying concern about 
judicially legislating a federal law of unfair competition does not 
apply to Section 43(a). Accordingly, the lack of any express 
reference to the well-known marks doctrine in Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act should not be a bar to its recognition under the 
section. 
C. Problems with the Fourth Circuit’s judgment 
While the Fourth Circuit reached the right result in 
enjoining Belmora from using Bayer‘s well-known ―FLANAX‖ 
mark in the United States, the reasoning it applied is inherently 
problematic and ought not to be followed by future courts. 
First, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a long line of prior cases 
treating domestic use as a pre-condition for a Section 43(a) claim 
on the basis that it was not the focal point in those cases.63 While 
this is unobjectionable from a purely doctrinal point of view, the 
Fourth Circuit‘s approach gave short shrift to the policy 
considerations underlying the territoriality principle. The better 
way around these adverse authorities would have been to 
acknowledge the territoriality principle, but at the same time 
recognize that it should not be absolute. Specifically, the well-
known marks doctrine may be recognized as a limited exception 
to the territoriality principle so that United States law continues 
to prevent consumer confusion and protect producer goodwill in 
line with the reality that a mark holder‘s reputation may 
transcend both geographical and national boundaries in today‘s 
technologically advanced society. 
Second, the examples raised by the Fourth Circuit to support 
its conclusion—that use in United States commerce is not 
required for a Section 43(a) claim64—miss the mark. Section 43(a) 
                                                                                                     
which the United States is also a party is a stretch‖ (quoting § 1126)). 
 63.  See Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, No. 15-1335, 2016 WL 
1135518, at *6 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2016) (rejecting the position that ―§ 43(a) 
claims have an unstated requirement that the plaintiff have first used its own 
mark (word, term, name, symbol, or device) in U.S. commerce before a cause of 
action will lie against a defendant who is breaching the statute‖). 
 64.  See id. at *7 (―The district court thus erred in requiring Bayer, as the 
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of the Lanham Act encompasses, inter alia, the two related but 
distinct causes of action of trademark infringement and passing 
off.65 While both causes of action share similar policy 
considerations66 given their shared ancestry,67 passing off 
proscribes a wider range of unfair and anticompetitive activities 
than trademark infringement. In contrast to trademark law 
which is concerned with ―misrepresentation[s] of source or 
sponsorship [that] arise[] solely from the unauthorized use[s] 
of . . . trademark[s] or other indicia of identification‖,68 the actions 
in passing off asserted in the generic mark and reverse passing 
off cases do not even require the plaintiffs to make any uses of 
valid trademarks in the first place. Thus, it is logically 
indefensible for the court to assume that all Section 43(a) claims 
are the same and reason that just because use in United States 
commerce is not required to bring certain claims under Section 
43(a), it is not required for all claims under Section 43(a). As 
illustrated above, there are strong reasons justifying the need for 
the territoriality principle in trademark law, and this Article 
merely argues for a limited exception when well known marks 
are involved.  
Finally, the Fourth Circuit‘s decision dangerously suggests 
that foreign marks need not be sufficiently well known to be 
protected under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. While the court, 
consistent with the procedural posture of the case, accepted as a 
fact that Bayer‘s ―FLANAX‖ mark was well known ―to Mexican-
                                                                                                     
plaintiff, to have pled its prior use of its own mark in U.S. commerce . . . .‖). 
 65.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 785 (1992). (―Section 
43(a) . . . codified, among other things, the related common-law torts of technical 
trademark infringement and passing off, . . . which were causes of action for 
false descriptions or representations concerning a good‘s or service‘s source of 
production.‖). 
 66.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(―Since passing off interferes with the opportunity to reap the benefits of a 
favorable reputation, investments in quality, service and promotion are 
undermined by misrepresentations of source. Passing off also deprives 
purchasers of the opportunity to distinguish among the goods and services of 
competing sellers.‖) 
 67.  Id. (noting that passing off and ―the law on trademarks developed 
largely from English and American common law decisions imposing liability on 
a seller who diverted trade from another by fraudulently misrepresenting that 
the goods had been produced by the other.‖). 
 68.  Id. 
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Americans and other Hispanics in the United States,‖69 nowhere 
in the judgment did the court allude to the requirement that a 
foreign mark not used in the United States must be sufficiently 
well known for the mark holder to assert a Section 43(a) claim. 
This could have been because the court jettisoned the 
requirement of use in United States commerce as a condition 
precedent to bringing a Section 43(a) action altogether. However, 
if this were indeed the case, the court‘s decision would represent 
a wrong turn in the law that future courts should not follow. 
Part II has shown that the well-known marks doctrine exists 
to prevent consumer confusion and preserve producer goodwill—
the key tenets of United States trademark law. Accordingly, to 
ensure that these policy goals are furthered, there is a need for 
the mark ―to be sufficiently well known in the United States in 
the relevant sector of the public such that this defendant‘s use is 
likely to cause confusion among a substantial number of 
persons.‖70 If a mark used exclusively overseas were not 
sufficiently well known in the United States, a local business that 
appropriates the foreign mark for its goods and/or services would 
not be capitalizing on the foreign mark‘s goodwill and there 
would be minimal possibility of consumer confusion. That said, 
while a requirement of renown is clearly essential to ensure that 
trademark law keeps in line with its underlying policy 
considerations, the more difficult issue is to determine how well 
known a foreign mark must be to be protected under the well-
known marks doctrine. 
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Grupo, the 
requirement of renown should be satisfied if ―a substantial 
percentage of consumers . . . in the geographic area where the 
defendant uses the alleged infringing mark‖71 are familiar with 
the foreign mark. This ―substantial percentage‖ standard is a 
normatively desirable standard for the protection of foreign 
marks without domestic use, as it represents a good halfway 
point between the far too lenient standard of ―appreciable 
                                                                                                     
 69.  Belmora, 2016 WL 1135518, at *1. 
 70.  MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 29:4.  
 71.  Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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number‖ 72 and the far too strict standard of ―overwhelming 
majority.‖73 With respect to the former, it is likely that an 
ordinary mark used in the United States will already be known 
by an ―appreciable number‖ of consumers. Thus, if the 
―appreciable number‖ standard were used to determine whether a 
mark is well known, the well-known marks exception would 
―eclipse the territoriality rule entirely.‖74 On the other hand, the 
―overwhelming majority‖ standard is too onerous and would make 
it too difficult for foreign mark holders to protect their marks in 
the United States. In turn, this would effectively render the well-
known marks doctrine a nullity and offer scant protection against 
the harms that the doctrine seeks to prevent in the first place.  
In addition, the ―substantial percentage‖ standard acts as a 
safeguard against a potential concern that foreign mark holders 
may willy-nilly enjoin domestic users who have adopted a mark 
not previously used in the United States in good faith. This is 
because the renown of the foreign mark in the relevant market 
would be strong evidence suggesting that the domestic user 
adopted the mark to misappropriate the goodwill that the foreign 
mark holder enjoyed in his mark.75 
V. Conclusion 
Since 2007, the split between the Ninth and Second Circuits 
has generated much uncertainty on the issue of whether well 
known foreign marks not used in the United States are protected 
under the Lanham Act—an issue that necessitates expeditious 
resolution in this age of ―glocalization,‖76 where goodwill 
transcends national boundaries. While the courts agree that 
strong policy reasons support the recognition of the well-known 
marks doctrine, they disagree on whether the territoriality 
                                                                                                     
 72.  Mostert, supra note 37, at 121. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1096. 
 75.  See LaLonde, supra note 3, at 1420 (―If a substantial number of 
consumers associate the foreign mark with its foreign mark with its foreign 
owner, that would be a sufficiently high degree of renown to impute bad faith to 
a United States user and to give notice to a company choosing trademarks in the 
United States.‖). 
 76.  Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 959. 
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principle is or ought to be absolute and whether the Lanham Act 
incorporates the doctrine. 
The Fourth Circuit‘s recent decision on the protectability of a 
foreign mark not used or registered in the United States under 
the Lanham Act provides a good opportunity for courts and 
commentators alike to reconsider the applicability of the well-
known marks doctrine. This Article argues that future courts 
should recognize the doctrine as a matter of sound policy and 
ground its statutory basis in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as 
the Fourth Circuit had done in protecting Bayer‘s ―FLANAX‖ 
mark. However, as highlighted in Part IV.C, there are various 
problematic aspects to the Fourth Circuit‘s judgment and thus, 
future courts should not mechanically follow its decision. 
 
 
